CWE-1319
Improper Protection against Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EM-FI)
Extended description
Electromagnetic fault injection may allow an attacker to locally and dynamically modify the signals (both internal and external) of an integrated circuit. EM-FI attacks consist of producing a local, transient magnetic field near the device, inducing current in the device wires. A typical EMFI setup is made up of a pulse injection circuit that generates a high current transient in an EMI coil, producing an abrupt magnetic pulse which couples to the target producing faults in the device, which can lead to: Bypassing security mechanisms such as secure JTAG or Secure Boot Leaking device information Modifying program flow Perturbing secure hardware modules (e.g. random number generators)
Common consequences1
- ConfidentialityIntegrityAccess ControlAvailabilityModify MemoryRead MemoryGain Privileges or Assume IdentityBypass Protection MechanismExecute Unauthorized Code or Commands
Potential mitigations1
- Architecture and DesignImplementation
1. Redundancy - By replicating critical operations and comparing the two outputs can help indicate whether a fault has been injected. 2. Error detection and correction codes - Gay, Mael, et al. proposed a new scheme that not only detects faults injected by a malicious adversary but also automatically corrects single nibble/byte errors introduced by low-multiplicity faults. 3. Fail by default coding - When checking conditions (switch or if) check all possible cases and fail by default because the default case in a switch (or the else part of a cascaded if-else-if construct) is used for dealing with the last possible (and valid) value without checking. This is prone to fault injection because this alternative is easily selected as a result of potential data manipulation [REF-1141]. 4. Random Behavior - adding random delays before critical operations, so that timing is not predictable. 5. Program Flow Integrity Protection - The program flow can be secured by integrating run-time checking aiming at detecting control flow inconsistencies. One such example is tagging the source code to indicate the points not to be bypassed [REF-1147]. 6. Sensors - Usage of sensors can detect variations in voltage and current. 7. Shields - physical barriers to protect the chips from malicious manipulation.
Relationships1
- ChildOfCWE-693
CVEs referencing this CWE6
| CVE | Description | Severity | EPSS | Flags | Modified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2022-26131 | Power Line Communications PLC4TRUCKS J2497 trailer receivers are susceptible to remote RF induced signals. | CRITICAL9.8 | 1.27%p66 | 2025-04-16 | |
| CVE-2024-31510 | An issue in Open Quantum Safe liboqs v.10.0 allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via the crypto_sign_signature parameter in the /pqcrystals-dilithium-standard_ml-dsa-44-ipd_avx2/sign.c component. | CRITICAL9.8 | 0.62%p45 | 2025-08-20 | |
| CVE-2023-5138 | Glitch detection is not enabled by default for the CortexM33 core in Silicon Labs secure vault high parts EFx32xG2xB, except EFR32xG21B. | MEDIUM6.8 | 0.27%p19 | 2025-06-03 | |
| CVE-2022-42784 | A vulnerability has been identified in LOGO! 12/24RCE (6ED1052-1MD08-0BA1) (All versions >= V8.3), LOGO! 12/24RCEo (6ED1052-2MD08-0BA1) (All versions >= V8.3), LOGO! 230RCE (6ED1052-1FB08-0BA1) (All versions >= V8.3), LOGO! 230RCEo (6ED1052-2FB08-0BA1) (All versions >= V8.3), LOGO! 24CE (6ED1052-1CC08-0BA1) (All versions >= V8.3), LOGO! 24CEo (6ED1052-2CC08-0BA1) (All versions >= V8.3), LOGO! 24RCE (6ED1052-1HB08-0BA1) (All versions >= V8.3), LOGO! 24RCEo (6ED1052-2HB08-0BA1) (All versions >= V8.3), SIPLUS LOGO! 12/24RCE (6AG1052-1MD08-7BA1) (All versions >= V8.3), SIPLUS LOGO! 12/24RCEo (6AG1052-2MD08-7BA1) (All versions >= V8.3), SIPLUS LOGO! 230RCE (6AG1052-1FB08-7BA1) (All versions >= V8.3), SIPLUS LOGO! 230RCEo (6AG1052-2FB08-7BA1) (All versions >= V8.3), SIPLUS LOGO! 24CE (6AG1052-1CC08-7BA1) (All versions >= V8.3), SIPLUS LOGO! 24CEo (6AG1052-2CC08-7BA1) (All versions >= V8.3), SIPLUS LOGO! 24RCE (6AG1052-1HB08-7BA1) (All versions >= V8.3), SIPLUS LOGO! 24RCEo (6AG1052-2HB08-7BA1) (All versions >= V8.3). Affected devices are vulnerable to an electromagnetic fault injection. This could allow an attacker to dump and debug the firmware, including the manipulation of memory. Further actions could allow to inject public keys of custom created key pairs which are then signed by the product CA. The generation of a custom certificate allows communication with, and impersonation of, any device of the same version. | MEDIUM6.8 | 0.25%p16 | 2024-11-21 | |
| CVE-2025-9709 | On-Chip Debug and Test Interface With Improper Access Control and Improper Protection against Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EM-FI) in Nordic Semiconductor nRF52810 allow attacker to perform EM Fault Injection and bypass APPROTECT at runtime, requiring the least amount of modification to the hardware system possible. | NONE | 0.22%p12 | 2026-04-15 | |
| CVE-2025-1566 | DNS Leak in Native System VPN in Google ChromeOS Dev Channel on ChromeOS 16002.23.0 allows network observers to expose plaintext DNS queries via failure to properly tunnel DNS traffic during VPN state transitions. | HIGH7.5 | 0.19%p9 | 2025-07-08 |