CVE-2025-24371

CometBFT is a distributed, Byzantine fault-tolerant, deterministic state machine replication engine. In the `blocksync` protocol peers send their `base` and `latest` heights when they connect to a new node (`A`), which is syncing to the tip of a network. `base` acts as a lower ground and informs `A` that the peer only has blocks starting from height `base`. `latest` height informs `A` about the latest block in a network. Normally, nodes would only report increasing heights. If `B` fails to provide the latest block, `B` is removed and the `latest` height (target height) is recalculated based on other nodes `latest` heights. The existing code however doesn't check for the case where `B` first reports `latest` height `X` and immediately after height `Y`, where `X > Y`. `A` will be trying to catch up to 2000 indefinitely. This condition requires the introduction of malicious code in the full node first reporting some non-existing `latest` height, then reporting lower `latest` height and nodes which are syncing using `blocksync` protocol. This issue has been patched in versions 1.0.1 and 0.38.17 and all users are advised to upgrade. Operators may attempt to ban malicious peers from the network as a workaround.

CometBFT is a distributed, Byzantine fault-tolerant, deterministic state machine replication engine. In the `blocksync` protocol peers send their `base` and `latest` heights when they connect to a new node (`A`), which is syncing to the tip of a network. `base` acts as a lower ground and informs `A` that the peer only has blocks starting from height `base`. `latest` height informs `A` about the latest block in a network. Normally, nodes would only report increasing heights. If `B` fails to provide the latest block, `B` is removed and the `latest` height (target height) is recalculated based on other nodes `latest` heights. The existing code however doesn't check for the case where `B` first reports `latest` height `X` and immediately after height `Y`, where `X > Y`. `A` will be trying to catch up to 2000 indefinitely. This condition requires the introduction of malicious code in the full node first reporting some non-existing `latest` height, then reporting lower `latest` height and nodes which are syncing using `blocksync` protocol. This issue has been patched in versions 1.0.1 and 0.38.17 and all users are advised to upgrade. Operators may attempt to ban malicious peers from the network as a workaround.

CometBFT allows a malicious peer to make node stuck in blocksync in github.com/cometbft/cometbft

Name: ASA-2025-001: Malicious peer can disrupt node's ability to sync via blocksync Component: CometBFT [OUTDATED] Criticality: Medium (Considerable Impact; Possible Likelihood per [ACMv1.2](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md)) **Update of Criticality on 2026-03-06**: We've made a mistake and over-rated the criticality of this bug in our initial triage. We have calibrated our vulnerability rating internally and updated the criticality of this bug to be Informational (Negligible Impact, Possible Likelihood) Affected versions: <= v0.38.16, v1.0.0 Affected users: Validators, Full nodes ### Impact A malicious peer may be able to interfere with a node's ability to sync blocks with peers via the blocksync mechanism. In the `blocksync` protocol peers send their `base` and `latest` heights when they connect to a new node (`A`), which is syncing to the tip of a network. `base` acts as a lower ground and informs `A` that the peer only has blocks starting from height `base`. `latest` height informs `A` about the latest block in a network. Normally, nodes would only report increasing heights: ``` B: {base: 100, latest: 1000} B: {base: 100, latest: 1001} B: {base: 100, latest: 1002} ... ``` If `B` fails to provide the latest block, `B` is removed and the `latest` height (target height) is recalculated based on other nodes `latest` heights. The existing code hovewer doesn't check for the case where `B` first reports `latest` height `X` and immediately after height `Y`, where `X > Y`. For example: ``` B: {base: 100, latest: 2000} B: {base: 100, latest: 1001} B: {base: 100, latest: 1002} ... ``` `A` will be trying to catch up to 2000 indefinitely. Even if `B` disconnects, the `latest` height (target height) won't be recalculated because `A` "doesn't know where 2000" came from per see. #### Impact Qualification This condition requires the introduction of malicious code in the full node first reporting a non-existing `latest` height, then reporting lower `latest` height and nodes which are syncing using `blocksync` protocol. ### Patches The new CometBFT releases [v1.0.1](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/releases/tag/v1.0.1) and [v0.38.17](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/releases/tag/v0.38.17) fix this issue. Unreleased code in the main is patched as well. ### Workarounds When the operator notices `blocksync` is stuck, they can identify the peer from which that message with "invalid" height was received. This may require increasing the logging level of the `blocksync` module. This peer can then be subsequently banned at the p2p layer as a temporary mitigation. ### References If you have questions about Interchain security efforts, please reach out to our official communication channel at [security@interchain.io](mailto:security@interchain.io). For more information about the Interchain Foundation’s engagement with Amulet, and to sign up for security notification emails, please see https://github.com/interchainio/security. A Github Security Advisory for this issue is available in the CometBFT [repository](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/security/advisories/GHSA-22qq-3xwm-r5x4). For more information about CometBFT, see https://docs.cometbft.com/. EDIT: Please notice that this has been updated to be `informational` severity. This can be avoided by ensuring that one is not connected to a malicious peer during blocksync.

CometBFT es un motor de replicación de máquina de estados determinista, tolerante a fallas bizantinas y distribuido. En el protocolo `blocksync`, los pares envían sus alturas `base` y `latest` cuando se conectan a un nuevo nodo (`A`), que se sincroniza con la punta de una red. `base` actúa como una base inferior e informa a `A` que el par solo tiene bloques que comienzan con la altura `base`. La altura `latest` informa a `A` sobre el último bloque en una red. Normalmente, los nodos solo informarían alturas crecientes. Si `B` no proporciona el último bloque, `B` se elimina y la altura `latest` (altura objetivo) se recalcula en función de las alturas `latest` de otros nodos. Sin embargo, el código existente no verifica el caso en el que `B` primero informa la `latest` altura `X` e inmediatamente después la altura `Y`, donde `X &gt; Y`. `A` intentará alcanzar el 2000 indefinidamente. Esta condición requiere la introducción de código malicioso en el nodo completo que primero informa una altura `latest` inexistente, luego informa una altura `latest` menor y nodos que se sincronizan mediante el protocolo `blocksync`. Este problema se ha corregido en las versiones 1.0.1 y 0.38.17 y se recomienda a todos los usuarios que actualicen. Los operadores pueden intentar prohibir el acceso de pares maliciosos a la red como workaround.