CVE-2026-28466

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.14 contain a vulnerability in the gateway in which it fails to sanitize internal approval fields in node.invoke parameters, allowing authenticated clients to bypass exec approval gating for system.run commands. Attackers with valid gateway credentials can inject approval control fields to execute arbitrary commands on connected node hosts, potentially compromising developer workstations and CI runners.

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.14 contain a vulnerability in the gateway in which it fails to sanitize internal approval fields in node.invoke parameters, allowing authenticated clients to bypass exec approval gating for system.run commands. Attackers with valid gateway credentials can inject approval control fields to execute arbitrary commands on connected node hosts, potentially compromising developer workstations and CI runners.

### Summary A remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the gateway-to-node invocation path allowed an authenticated gateway client to bypass node-host exec approvals by injecting internal control fields into `node.invoke` parameters. ### Affected Component - Gateway method: `node.invoke` for node command `system.run` - Node host runner: exec approval gating for `system.run` ### Impact If an attacker can authenticate to a gateway (for example via a leaked/shared gateway token or a paired device token with `operator.write`), they could execute arbitrary commands on connected node hosts that support `system.run`. This can lead to full compromise of developer workstations, CI runners, and servers running the node host. ### Technical Details The gateway forwarded user-controlled `params` to node hosts without sanitizing internal approval fields. The node host treated `params.approved === true` and/or `params.approvalDecision` as sufficient to skip the approval workflow. ### Fix Patched in **OpenClaw `2026.2.14`**. - Commits: - `318379cdb8d045da0009b0051bd0e712e5c65e2d` - `a7af646fdab124a7536998db6bd6ad567d2b06b0` - `c1594627421f95b6bc4ad7c606657dc75b5ad0ce` - `0af76f5f0e93540efbdf054895216c398692afcd` - Gateway strips untrusted approval control fields from `system.run` user input. - Gateway only re-attaches approval flags when `params.runId` references a valid `exec.approval.request` record and the request context matches. Approval IDs are bound to the requesting device identity (stable across reconnects), preventing replay by other clients. - Gateway forwards only an allowlisted set of `system.run` parameters, preventing future control-field smuggling. ### Mitigations - Upgrade to `2026.2.14` or later. - Restrict access to the gateway (do not expose it to untrusted networks/users). - Rotate gateway credentials if you suspect token/password exposure. - Disable remote command execution on nodes by blocking `system.run` at the gateway (`gateway.nodes.denyCommands`) and/or by configuring node exec security to `deny`. ### Credits OpenClaw thanks @222n5 for reporting this issue.

### Summary A remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the gateway-to-node invocation path allowed an authenticated gateway client to bypass node-host exec approvals by injecting internal control fields into `node.invoke` parameters. ### Affected Component - Gateway method: `node.invoke` for node command `system.run` - Node host runner: exec approval gating for `system.run` ### Impact If an attacker can authenticate to a gateway (for example via a leaked/shared gateway token or a paired device token with `operator.write`), they could execute arbitrary commands on connected node hosts that support `system.run`. This can lead to full compromise of developer workstations, CI runners, and servers running the node host. ### Technical Details The gateway forwarded user-controlled `params` to node hosts without sanitizing internal approval fields. The node host treated `params.approved === true` and/or `params.approvalDecision` as sufficient to skip the approval workflow. ### Fix Patched in **OpenClaw `2026.2.14`**. - Commits: - `318379cdb8d045da0009b0051bd0e712e5c65e2d` - `a7af646fdab124a7536998db6bd6ad567d2b06b0` - `c1594627421f95b6bc4ad7c606657dc75b5ad0ce` - `0af76f5f0e93540efbdf054895216c398692afcd` - Gateway strips untrusted approval control fields from `system.run` user input. - Gateway only re-attaches approval flags when `params.runId` references a valid `exec.approval.request` record and the request context matches. Approval IDs are bound to the requesting device identity (stable across reconnects), preventing replay by other clients. - Gateway forwards only an allowlisted set of `system.run` parameters, preventing future control-field smuggling. ### Mitigations - Upgrade to `2026.2.14` or later. - Restrict access to the gateway (do not expose it to untrusted networks/users). - Rotate gateway credentials if you suspect token/password exposure. - Disable remote command execution on nodes by blocking `system.run` at the gateway (`gateway.nodes.denyCommands`) and/or by configuring node exec security to `deny`. ### Credits OpenClaw thanks @222n5 for reporting this issue.

OpenClaw versiones anteriores a 2026.2.14 contienen una vulnerabilidad en el gateway en la que no logra sanear campos de aprobación internos en los parámetros de node.invoke, permitiendo a clientes autenticados eludir el control de aprobación de ejecución para comandos system.run. Atacantes con credenciales de gateway válidas pueden inyectar campos de control de aprobación para ejecutar comandos arbitrarios en hosts de nodo conectados, comprometiendo potencialmente estaciones de trabajo de desarrolladores y CI runners.