CVE-2025-65964

n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Versions 0.123.1 through 1.119.1 do not have adequate protections to prevent RCE through the project's pre-commit hooks. The Add Config operation allows workflows to set arbitrary Git configuration values, including core.hooksPath, which can point to a malicious Git hook that executes arbitrary commands on the n8n host during subsequent Git operations. Exploitation requires the ability to create or modify an n8n workflow using the Git node. This issue is fixed in version 1.119.2. Workarounds include excluding the Git Node (Docs) and avoiding cloning or interacting with untrusted repositories using the Git Node.

n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Versions 0.123.1 through 1.119.1 do not have adequate protections to prevent RCE through the project's pre-commit hooks. The Add Config operation allows workflows to set arbitrary Git configuration values, including core.hooksPath, which can point to a malicious Git hook that executes arbitrary commands on the n8n host during subsequent Git operations. Exploitation requires the ability to create or modify an n8n workflow using the Git node. This issue is fixed in version 1.119.2. Workarounds include excluding the Git Node (Docs) and avoiding cloning or interacting with untrusted repositories using the Git Node.

### Impact The n8n Git node allows workflows to set arbitrary Git configuration values through the _Add Config_ operation. When an attacker-controlled workflow sets `core.hooksPath` to a directory within the cloned repository containing a Git hook such as `pre-commit`, Git executes that hook during subsequent Git operations. Because Git hooks run as local system commands, this behavior can lead to **arbitrary command execution** on the underlying n8n host. Successful exploitation requires the ability to create or modify an n8n workflow that uses the Git node. Affected versions: **≥ 0.123.1 and < 1.119.2** ### Patches This issue has been patched in **n8n version 1.119.2**. All users running affected versions should upgrade to **1.119.2 or later**. ### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, the following mitigations can reduce exposure: - Exclude the Git node ([Docs](https://n8n-docs.teamlab.info/hosting/securing/blocking-nodes/#exclude-nodes)). - Avoid cloning or interacting with untrusted repositories using the Git Node.

### Impact The n8n Git node allows workflows to set arbitrary Git configuration values through the _Add Config_ operation. When an attacker-controlled workflow sets `core.hooksPath` to a directory within the cloned repository containing a Git hook such as `pre-commit`, Git executes that hook during subsequent Git operations. Because Git hooks run as local system commands, this behavior can lead to **arbitrary command execution** on the underlying n8n host. Successful exploitation requires the ability to create or modify an n8n workflow that uses the Git node. Affected versions: **≥ 0.123.1 and < 1.119.2** ### Patches This issue has been patched in **n8n version 1.119.2**. All users running affected versions should upgrade to **1.119.2 or later**. ### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, the following mitigations can reduce exposure: - Exclude the Git node ([Docs](https://n8n-docs.teamlab.info/hosting/securing/blocking-nodes/#exclude-nodes)). - Avoid cloning or interacting with untrusted repositories using the Git Node.