The Dyson MQTT server (2022 and possibly later) allows publications and subscriptions by a client that has the correct values of…
mitre·CWE-420·Published 2025-10-29
The Dyson MQTT server (2022 and possibly later) allows publications and subscriptions by a client that has the correct values of AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, AWS_SESSION_TOKEN, and device serial number, even if a device (such as a Pure Hot+Cool device) has been removed and is not visible in the supported MyDyson app. This could allow an unexpected actor to obtain control and set the room temperature (up to 37 Celsius) if ownership of the device is transferred without wiping the device. NOTE: the Supplier's position is that this is a potential vulnerability that dates back 4 years ago in 2022 and "we are unable to replicate that anymore." Based on the submitted report, in order to leverage this issue, an attacker needs to own a Dyson device with full privileges, sniff for the AWS credentials, and then transfer ownership of that Dyson device to the victim. Even if these steps were successfully accomplished, the attacker only acquires the ability to configure the Dyson device within its safe operating range, and does not acquire the ability to execute code on the device or obtain sensitive information.
The Dyson MQTT server (2022 and possibly later) allows publications and subscriptions by a client that has the correct values of AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, AWS_SESSION_TOKEN, and device serial number, even if a device (such as a Pure Hot+Cool device) has been removed and is not visible in the supported MyDyson app. This could allow an unexpected actor to obtain control and set the room temperature (up to 37 Celsius) if ownership of the device is transferred without wiping the device. NOTE: the Supplier's position is that this is a potential vulnerability that dates back 4 years ago in 2022 and "we are unable to replicate that anymore." Based on the submitted report, in order to leverage this issue, an attacker needs to own a Dyson device with full privileges, sniff for the AWS credentials, and then transfer ownership of that Dyson device to the victim. Even if these steps were successfully accomplished, the attacker only acquires the ability to configure the Dyson device within its safe operating range, and does not acquire the ability to execute code on the device or obtain sensitive information.
El servidor MQTT de Dyson (2022 y posiblemente posterior) permite publicaciones y suscripciones por un cliente que tiene los valores correctos de AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, AWS_SESSION_TOKEN y el número de serie del dispositivo, incluso si un dispositivo (como un dispositivo Pure Hot+Cool) ha sido eliminado y no es visible en la aplicación MyDyson compatible. Esto podría permitir a un actor inesperado obtener el control y establecer la temperatura de la habitación (hasta 37 grados Celsius) si la propiedad del dispositivo se transfiere sin borrar el dispositivo. NOTA: la posición del Proveedor es que esta es una vulnerabilidad potencial que data de hace 4 años en 2022 y 'ya no podemos replicar eso'. Según el informe presentado, para aprovechar este problema, un atacante necesita poseer un dispositivo Dyson con privilegios completos, rastrear las credenciales de AWS y luego transferir la propiedad de ese dispositivo Dyson a la víctima. Incluso si estos pasos se lograran con éxito, el atacante solo adquiere la capacidad de configurar el dispositivo Dyson dentro de su rango operativo seguro, y no adquiere la capacidad de ejecutar código en el dispositivo u obtener información sensible.
| Version | Type | Source | Base | Exp | Impact | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | Primary | cve.org | 3.0 | — | — | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N |
| 3.1 | Primary | cve.org | 3.0 | — | — | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N |
| 3.1 | Secondary | NVD | 3.0 | 1.3 | 1.4 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N |