CVE-2025-24787

WhoDB is an open source database management tool. In affected versions the application is vulnerable to parameter injection in database connection strings, which allows an attacker to read local files on the machine the application is running on. The application uses string concatenation to build database connection URIs which are then passed to corresponding libraries responsible for setting up the database connections. This string concatenation is done unsafely and without escaping or encoding the user input. This allows an user, in many cases, to inject arbitrary parameters into the URI string. These parameters can be potentially dangerous depending on the libraries used. One of these dangerous parameters is `allowAllFiles` in the library `github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql`. Should this be set to `true`, the library enables running the `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE` query on any file on the host machine (in this case, the machine that WhoDB is running on). By injecting `&allowAllFiles=true` into the connection URI and connecting to any MySQL server (such as an attacker-controlled one), the attacker is able to read local files. This issue has been addressed in version 0.45.0 and all users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

WhoDB is an open source database management tool. In affected versions the application is vulnerable to parameter injection in database connection strings, which allows an attacker to read local files on the machine the application is running on. The application uses string concatenation to build database connection URIs which are then passed to corresponding libraries responsible for setting up the database connections. This string concatenation is done unsafely and without escaping or encoding the user input. This allows an user, in many cases, to inject arbitrary parameters into the URI string. These parameters can be potentially dangerous depending on the libraries used. One of these dangerous parameters is `allowAllFiles` in the library `github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql`. Should this be set to `true`, the library enables running the `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE` query on any file on the host machine (in this case, the machine that WhoDB is running on). By injecting `&allowAllFiles=true` into the connection URI and connecting to any MySQL server (such as an attacker-controlled one), the attacker is able to read local files. This issue has been addressed in version 0.45.0 and all users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

WhoDB allows parameter injection in DB connection URIs leading to local file inclusion in github.com/clidey/whodb/core

### Summary The application is vulnerable to parameter injection in database connection strings, which allows an attacker to read local files on the machine the application is running on. ### Details The application uses string concatenation to build database connection URIs which are then passed to corresponding libraries responsible for setting up the database connections. This string concatenation is done unsafely and without escaping or encoding the user input. This allows an user, in many cases, to inject arbitrary parameters into the URI string. These parameters can be potentially dangerous depending on the libraries used. One of these dangerous parameters is `allowAllFiles` in the library `github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql`. Should this be set to `true`, the library enables running the `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE` query on any file on the host machine (in this case, the machine that WhoDB is running on). Source: https://github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql/blob/7403860363ca112af503b4612568c3096fecb466/infile.go#L128 By injecting `&allowAllFiles=true` into the connection URI and connecting to any MySQL server (such as an attacker-controlled one), the attacker is able to read local files. ### PoC As this vulnerability does not require sending requests manually and can all be done using the WhoDB UI, screenshots are provided instead of HTTP requests. For this proof-of-concept, a clean instance of WhoDB and MySQL were set up using podman (docker is a suitable alternative): ``` podman network create whodb-poc podman run -d -p 8080:8080 --network whodb-poc docker.io/clidey/whodb podman run -d --name mysql -e MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=password --network whodb-poc docker.io/mysql:9 ``` The attacker connects to the database via WhoDB. Note that in the `Loc` field, the string `&allowAllFiles=true` is inserted:  After connecting, the attacker navigates to the scratchpad in `/scratchpad`. The attacker first creates a demo table: ```sql CREATE TABLE poc ( line TEXT ); ``` The attacker then enables loading files from the server side. For the sake of clarity, do note that while this is required, the file is not being read from the remote server where MySQL is running, but the local machine that WhoDB is running on. ```sql SET GLOBAL local_infile=1; ``` The attacker then uses the `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE` statement to read the contents of `/etc/passwd` (in this case from inside the container where WhoDB is running) into the previously created table: ```sql LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE '/etc/passwd' INTO TABLE poc FIELDS TERMINATED BY '\0' LINES TERMINATED BY '\n'; ``` The attacker then navigates to the `poc` table in the _Tables_ view and observes that the file has been read successfully:  ### Impact While this proof-of-concept demonstrates local file inclusion, the root cause of the issue is the unsafe construction of database connection URIs from user input. Not all database connector libraries used in WhoDB were inspected; there may be libraries which allow for even more impactful parameters. The attack requires no user authentication to WhoDB (only authentication to any database server, such as an attacker-controlled one) and no special configuration - the default configuration of the application is vulnerable.

WhoDB es una herramienta de gestión de bases de datos de código abierto. En las versiones afectadas, la aplicación es vulnerable a la inyección de parámetros en las cadenas de conexión de la base de datos, lo que permite a un atacante leer archivos locales en la máquina en la que se ejecuta la aplicación. La aplicación utiliza la concatenación de cadenas para crear las URI de conexión a la base de datos que luego se pasan a las librerías correspondientes responsables de configurar las conexiones a la base de datos. Esta concatenación de cadenas se realiza de forma insegura y sin escapar ni codificar la entrada del usuario. Esto permite a un usuario, en muchos casos, inyectar parámetros arbitrarios en la cadena URI. Estos parámetros pueden ser potencialmente peligrosos según las librerías utilizadas. Uno de estos parámetros peligrosos es `allowAllFiles` en la librería `github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql`. Si se establece en `true`, la librería permite ejecutar la consulta `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE` en cualquier archivo en la máquina host (en este caso, la máquina en la que se ejecuta WhoDB). Al inyectar `&allowAllFiles=true` en la URI de conexión y conectarse a cualquier servidor MySQL (como uno controlado por el atacante), el atacante puede leer archivos locales. Este problema se ha solucionado en la versión 0.45.0 y se recomienda a todos los usuarios que actualicen la versión. No se conocen workarounds para esta vulnerabilidad.