CVE-2022-31019

Vapor is a server-side Swift HTTP web framework. When using automatic content decoding an attacker can craft a request body that can make the server crash with the following request: `curl -d "array[_0][0][array][_0][0][array]$(for f in $(seq 1100); do echo -n '[_0][0][array]'; done)[string][_0]=hello%20world" http://localhost:8080/foo`. The issue is unbounded, attacker controlled stack growth which will at some point lead to a stack overflow and a process crash. This issue has been fixed in version 4.61.1.

Vapor is a server-side Swift HTTP web framework. When using automatic content decoding an attacker can craft a request body that can make the server crash with the following request: `curl -d "array[_0][0][array][_0][0][array]$(for f in $(seq 1100); do echo -n '[_0][0][array]'; done)[string][_0]=hello%20world" http://localhost:8080/foo`. The issue is unbounded, attacker controlled stack growth which will at some point lead to a stack overflow and a process crash. This issue has been fixed in version 4.61.1.

Vapor is an HTTP web framework for Swift. Vapor versions earlier than 4.61.1 are vulnerable to a denial of service in the URLEncodedFormDecoder. ### Impact When using automatic content decoding, e.g. ```swift app.post("foo") { request -> String in let foo = try request.content.decode(Foo.self) return "\(foo)" } ``` An attacker can craft a request body that can make the server crash with the following request: ``` curl -d "array[_0][0][array][_0][0][array]$(for f in $(seq 1100); do echo -n '[_0][0][array]'; done)[string][_0]=hello%20world" http://localhost:8080/foo ``` The issue is unbounded, attacker controlled stack growth which will at some point lead to a stack overflow. ### Patches Fixed in 4.61.1 ### Workarounds If you don't need to decode Form URL Encoded data, you can disable the `ContentConfiguration` so it won't be used. E.g. in **configure.swift** ```swift var contentConfig = ContentConfiguration() contentConfig.use(encoder: JSONEncoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .json) contentConfig.use(decoder: JSONDecoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .json) contentConfig.use(encoder: JSONEncoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .jsonAPI) contentConfig.use(decoder: JSONDecoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .jsonAPI) ContentConfiguration.global = contentConfig ``` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [the Vapor repo](https://github.com/vapor/vapor) * Ask in [Vapor Discord](http://vapor.team)

Vapor es un framework web Swift HTTP del lado del servidor. Cuando es usada la decodificación automática de contenido, un atacante puede diseñar un cuerpo de petición que puede hacer que el servidor se bloquee con la siguiente petición: "curl -d "array[_0][0][array][_0][array]$(for f in $(seq 1100); do echo -n "[_0][array]"; done)[string][_0]=hello%20world" http://localhost:8080/foo". El problema es el crecimiento ilimitado de la pila, controlado por el atacante, que en algún momento conllevará un desbordamiento de la pila y un bloqueo del proceso. Este problema ha sido corregido en versión 4.61.1