CVE-2022-29238

Jupyter Notebook is a web-based notebook environment for interactive computing. Prior to version 6.4.12, authenticated requests to the notebook server with `ContentsManager.allow_hidden = False` only prevented listing the contents of hidden directories, not accessing individual hidden files or files in hidden directories (i.e. hidden files were 'hidden' but not 'inaccessible'). This could lead to notebook configurations allowing authenticated access to files that may reasonably be expected to be disallowed. Because fully authenticated requests are required, this is of relatively low impact. But if a server's root directory contains sensitive files whose only protection from the server is being hidden (e.g. `~/.ssh` while serving $HOME), then any authenticated requests could access files if their names are guessable. Such contexts also necessarily have full access to the server and therefore execution permissions, which also generally grants access to all the same files. So this does not generally result in any privilege escalation or increase in information access, only an additional, unintended means by which the files could be accessed. Version 6.4.12 contains a patch for this issue. There are currently no known workarounds.

Jupyter Notebook is a web-based notebook environment for interactive computing. Prior to version 6.4.12, authenticated requests to the notebook server with `ContentsManager.allow_hidden = False` only prevented listing the contents of hidden directories, not accessing individual hidden files or files in hidden directories (i.e. hidden files were 'hidden' but not 'inaccessible'). This could lead to notebook configurations allowing authenticated access to files that may reasonably be expected to be disallowed. Because fully authenticated requests are required, this is of relatively low impact. But if a server's root directory contains sensitive files whose only protection from the server is being hidden (e.g. `~/.ssh` while serving $HOME), then any authenticated requests could access files if their names are guessable. Such contexts also necessarily have full access to the server and therefore execution permissions, which also generally grants access to all the same files. So this does not generally result in any privilege escalation or increase in information access, only an additional, unintended means by which the files could be accessed. Version 6.4.12 contains a patch for this issue. There are currently no known workarounds.

Jupyter Notebook is a web-based notebook environment for interactive computing. Prior to version 6.4.12, authenticated requests to the notebook server with `ContentsManager.allow_hidden = False` only prevented listing the contents of hidden directories, not accessing individual hidden files or files in hidden directories (i.e. hidden files were 'hidden' but not 'inaccessible'). This could lead to notebook configurations allowing authenticated access to files that may reasonably be expected to be disallowed. Because fully authenticated requests are required, this is of relatively low impact. But if a server's root directory contains sensitive files whose only protection from the server is being hidden (e.g. `~/.ssh` while serving $HOME), then any authenticated requests could access files if their names are guessable. Such contexts also necessarily have full access to the server and therefore execution permissions, which also generally grants access to all the same files. So this does not generally result in any privilege escalation or increase in information access, only an additional, unintended means by which the files could be accessed. Version 6.4.12 contains a patch for this issue. There are currently no known workarounds.

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ Authenticated requests to the notebook server with `ContentsManager.allow_hidden = False` only prevented listing the contents of hidden directories, not accessing individual hidden files or files in hidden directories (i.e. hidden files were 'hidden' but not 'inaccessible'). This could lead to notebook configurations allowing authenticated access to files that may reasonably be expected to be disallowed. Because fully authenticated requests are required, this is of relatively low impact. But if a server's root directory contains sensitive files whose only protection from the server is being hidden (e.g. `~/.ssh` while serving $HOME), then any authenticated requests could access files if their names are guessable. Such contexts also necessarily have full access to the server and therefore execution permissions, which also generally grants access to all the same files. So this does not generally result in any privilege escalation or increase in information access, only an additional, unintended _means_ by which the files could be accessed. ### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ notebook 6.4.12 ### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ - Do not run the notebook server in a directory with hidden files, use subdirectories - Use a custom ContentsManager with additional checks for `self.is_hidden(path)` prior to completing actions ### References _Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_ ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [example link to repo](http://example.com) * Email us at [example email address](mailto:example@example.com)

Jupyter Notebook es un entorno de cuadernos basado en la web para la computación interactiva. En versiones anteriores a 6.4.12, las peticiones autenticadas al servidor del cuaderno con "ContentsManager.allow_hidden = False" sólo impedían listar el contenido de los directorios ocultos, no acceder a archivos individuales ocultos o a los archivos de directorios ocultos (es decir, los archivos ocultos estaban "ocultos" pero no "inaccesibles"). Esto podría conllevar a que las configuraciones de los ordenadores portátiles permitieran el acceso autenticado a archivos que razonablemente fueran esperados a que no estuvieran permitidos. Dado que son requeridas peticiones totalmente autenticadas, esto presenta un impacto relativamente bajo. Pero si el directorio root de un servidor contiene archivos confidenciales cuya única protección frente al servidor es estar oculto (por ejemplo, "~/.ssh" mientras sirve $HOME), entonces cualquier petición autenticada podría acceder a los archivos si sus nombres son adivinables. Tales contextos también presentan necesariamente acceso completo al servidor y, por lo tanto, permisos de ejecución, lo que generalmente también otorga acceso a todos los mismos archivos. Por lo tanto, esto no suele resultar en una escalada de privilegios o a un aumento del acceso a la información, sino a un medio adicional e involuntario por el que podría accederse a los archivos. La versión 6.4.12 contiene un parche para este problema. Actualmente no son conocidas mitigaciones para este problema