CVE-2020-15128

In OctoberCMS before version 1.0.468, encrypted cookie values were not tied to the name of the cookie the value belonged to. This meant that certain classes of attacks that took advantage of other theoretical vulnerabilities in user facing code (nothing exploitable in the core project itself) had a higher chance of succeeding. Specifically, if your usage exposed a way for users to provide unfiltered user input and have it returned to them as an encrypted cookie (ex. storing a user provided search query in a cookie) they could then use the generated cookie in place of other more tightly controlled cookies; or if your usage exposed the plaintext version of an encrypted cookie at any point to the user they could theoretically provide encrypted content from your application back to it as an encrypted cookie and force the framework to decrypt it for them. Issue has been fixed in build 468 (v1.0.468).

In OctoberCMS before version 1.0.468, encrypted cookie values were not tied to the name of the cookie the value belonged to. This meant that certain classes of attacks that took advantage of other theoretical vulnerabilities in user facing code (nothing exploitable in the core project itself) had a higher chance of succeeding. Specifically, if your usage exposed a way for users to provide unfiltered user input and have it returned to them as an encrypted cookie (ex. storing a user provided search query in a cookie) they could then use the generated cookie in place of other more tightly controlled cookies; or if your usage exposed the plaintext version of an encrypted cookie at any point to the user they could theoretically provide encrypted content from your application back to it as an encrypted cookie and force the framework to decrypt it for them. Issue has been fixed in build 468 (v1.0.468).

### Impact Previously encrypted cookie values were not tied to the name of the cookie the value belonged to. This meant that certain classes of attacks that took advantage of other theoretical vulnerabilities in user facing code (nothing exploitable in the core project itself) had a higher chance of succeeding. Specifically, if your usage exposed a way for users to provide unfiltered user input and have it returned to them as an encrypted cookie (ex. storing a user provided search query in a cookie) they could then use the generated cookie in place of other more tightly controlled cookies; or if your usage exposed the plaintext version of an encrypted cookie at any point to the user they could theoretically provide encrypted content from your application back to it as an encrypted cookie and force the framework to decrypt it for them. ### Patches Issue has been patched in Build 468 (v1.0.468). >**NOTE**: If you are using the cookie session driver, all of your session data will be invalidated. All other session drivers should smoothly upgrade to the changes (although the backend authentication persist cookie will also be invalidated requiring users to login again once their current session expires). ### Workarounds Apply https://github.com/octobercms/library/commit/28310d4fb336a1741b39498f4474497644a6875c to your installation manually if unable to upgrade to Build 468. ### References - https://blog.laravel.com/laravel-cookie-security-releases - https://github.com/laravel/framework/compare/4c7d118181d6c7f1f883643702df807ced016c5e...a731824421f9ebc586728ea9c7cff231a249aaa9 ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Email us at [hello@octobercms.com](mailto:hello@octobercms.com) ### Threat Assessment Assessed as Low given that it is not directly exploitable within the core but requires other security vulnerabilities within the application to have an effect and the severity of its effect depends entirely on the severity of those other holes in the application's defences. ### Acknowledgements Thanks to [Takashi Terada of Mitsui Bussan Secure Directions, Inc.](https://www.linkedin.com/in/takeshi-terada-b570a6100/) for finding the original issue in Laravel and @taylorotwell for sharing the report with the October CMS team.

### Impact Previously encrypted cookie values were not tied to the name of the cookie the value belonged to. This meant that certain classes of attacks that took advantage of other theoretical vulnerabilities in user facing code (nothing exploitable in the core project itself) had a higher chance of succeeding. Specifically, if your usage exposed a way for users to provide unfiltered user input and have it returned to them as an encrypted cookie (ex. storing a user provided search query in a cookie) they could then use the generated cookie in place of other more tightly controlled cookies; or if your usage exposed the plaintext version of an encrypted cookie at any point to the user they could theoretically provide encrypted content from your application back to it as an encrypted cookie and force the framework to decrypt it for them. ### Patches Issue has been patched in Build 468 (v1.0.468). >**NOTE**: If you are using the cookie session driver, all of your session data will be invalidated. All other session drivers should smoothly upgrade to the changes (although the backend authentication persist cookie will also be invalidated requiring users to login again once their current session expires). ### Workarounds Apply https://github.com/octobercms/library/commit/28310d4fb336a1741b39498f4474497644a6875c to your installation manually if unable to upgrade to Build 468. ### References - https://blog.laravel.com/laravel-cookie-security-releases - https://github.com/laravel/framework/compare/4c7d118181d6c7f1f883643702df807ced016c5e...a731824421f9ebc586728ea9c7cff231a249aaa9 ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Email us at [hello@octobercms.com](mailto:hello@octobercms.com) ### Threat Assessment Assessed as Low given that it is not directly exploitable within the core but requires other security vulnerabilities within the application to have an effect and the severity of its effect depends entirely on the severity of those other holes in the application's defences. ### Acknowledgements Thanks to [Takashi Terada of Mitsui Bussan Secure Directions, Inc.](https://www.linkedin.com/in/takeshi-terada-b570a6100/) for finding the original issue in Laravel and @taylorotwell for sharing the report with the October CMS team.

En OctoberCMS versiones anteriores a 1.0.468, los valores de cookies cifrados no estaban enlazados al nombre de la cookie a la que pertenecía el valor. Esto significaba que determinadas clases de ataques que toman ventaja a otras vulnerabilidades teóricas en el código de usuario (nada explotable en el proyecto central en sí) tenían una mayor oportunidad de éxito. Específicamente, si su uso expuso una forma para que los usuarios proporcionen información de usuario sin filtrar y que se la devuelva como una cookie cifrada (por ejemplo, almacenando una consulta de búsqueda proporcionada por el usuario en una cookie), podrían usar la cookie generada en lugar de otras cookies estrictamente controladas; o si su uso expuso la versión de texto plano de una cookie cifrada en algún momento al usuario, teóricamente podrían proporcionarle contenido cifrado de su aplicación como cookie cifrada y forzar al framework a descifrarla. El problema ha sido corregido en el build 468 (versión v1.0.468)