CVE-2017-5650

In Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.0.M18 and 8.5.0 to 8.5.12, the handling of an HTTP/2 GOAWAY frame for a connection did not close streams associated with that connection that were currently waiting for a WINDOW_UPDATE before allowing the application to write more data. These waiting streams each consumed a thread. A malicious client could therefore construct a series of HTTP/2 requests that would consume all available processing threads.

In Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.0.M18 and 8.5.0 to 8.5.12, the handling of an HTTP/2 GOAWAY frame for a connection did not close streams associated with that connection that were currently waiting for a WINDOW_UPDATE before allowing the application to write more data. These waiting streams each consumed a thread. A malicious client could therefore construct a series of HTTP/2 requests that would consume all available processing threads.

In Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.0.M18 and 8.5.0 to 8.5.12, the handling of an HTTP/2 GOAWAY frame for a connection did not close streams associated with that connection that were currently waiting for a WINDOW_UPDATE before allowing the application to write more data. These waiting streams each consumed a thread. A malicious client could therefore construct a series of HTTP/2 requests that would consume all available processing threads.

In Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.0.M18 and 8.5.0 to 8.5.12, the handling of an HTTP/2 GOAWAY frame for a connection did not close streams associated with that connection that were currently waiting for a WINDOW_UPDATE before allowing the application to write more data. These waiting streams each consumed a thread. A malicious client could therefore construct a series of HTTP/2 requests that would consume all available processing threads.

En Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 a 9.0.0.M18 y 8.5.0 a 8.5.12, el tratamiento de un marco HTTP/2 GOAWAY para una conexión que no cerró los flujos asociados con esa conexión que estaban esperando actualmente un WINDOW_UPDATE antes de permitir que la aplicación escriba más datos. Estos flujos de espera cada uno consumió un hilo. Un cliente malicioso podría construir una serie de peticiones HTTP/2 que consumirían todos los subprocesos de procesamiento disponibles.